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Abstract
Paul A. M. Dirac has been undoubtedly one of the central figures of the last
century physics, contributing in several and remarkable ways to the development
of Quantum Mechanics (QM); he was also at the centre of an active community of
physicists, with whom he had extensive interactions and correspondence. In par-
ticular, the British physicist was in close contact with Bohr, Heisenberg and Pauli.
For this reason, among others, Dirac is generally considered a supporter of the
Copenhagen interpretation of QM. Similarly, he was considered a physicist sym-
pathetic with the positivistic attitude which shaped the development of quantum
theory in the twenties. Against this background, the aim of the present essay is
twofold: on the one hand, we will argue that, analyzing specific examples taken from
Dirac’s published works, he can neither be considered a positivist nor a physicist
methodologically guided by the observability doctrine. On the other hand, we will
try to disentangle Dirac’s figure from the mentioned Copenhagen interpretation,
since in his long career he employed remarkably different – and often contradicting
– methodological principles and philosophical perspectives with respect to those
followed by the supporters of that interpretation.
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1 Introduction
Paul A. M. Dirac has been undoubtedly one of the central figures of the last century
physics, contributing in several and remarkable ways to the development of Quantum
Mechanics (QM). Many important results bear his name as for instance the bra-ket nota-
tion, which became the standard symbolic representation of the mathematical structure
of quantum theory, or the well-known equation for the motion of the relativistic electron,
which led to the discovery of the existence of anti-matter.
Moreover, as accurately showed in Wright (2016), Dirac was also at the centre of
an active community of physicists, with whom he had extensive interactions and corre-
spondence – contrary to the usual narration of him as a lone genius; in particular, it is
interesting to point out for the purposes of the present essay that the British physicist
was in close contact with Bohr, Heisenberg and Pauli, who in different ways heavily influ-
enced his work on quantum mechanics. For this reason, among others, Dirac is generally
considered a supporter of the so called Copenhagen interpretation, as emphasized for
instance in (Bokulich 2004, p. 377) and by Kragh in his excellent monograph on Dirac’s
scientific biography (Kragh 1990, p. 265). Similarly, he was considered a physicist sym-
pathetic with the positivistic attitude which shaped the development of quantum theory
in the twenties, being endorsed among others by notable scientists as Pauli, Heisenberg
and the members of the Göttingen school who gave decisive contributions to the new
quantum physics in those years.
Against this background, the aim of the present essay is two-fold: on the one hand,
we will argue that analyzing specific examples taken from Dirac published works, he
can neither be considered a positivist nor a physicist methodologically guided by the
observability doctrine, despite the influence that Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics – and
the empiricist philosophical principles characterizing it – exercised on Dirac’s approach
to quantum theory. On the other hand, we will try to disentangle Dirac’s figure from
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, since in his long career he employed
remarkably different – and often contradicting – methodological principles and philo-
sophical perspectives with respect to those followed by Bohr and Heisenberg.
In more detail, we will discuss two case studies showing that Dirac contradicted the
observability doctrine in different ways. For instance, not only he introduced in his phys-
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ical theories several theoretical entities which were not yet experimentally observed at
that time (e.g. the positrons), but also, and more significantly for our purposes, entities
which are in principle not observable (e.g. the infinite sea of negative energy electrons
or his quantum mechanical ether). In this context, the expression “in principle” needs
some clarification: we are not referring to a metaphysical impossibility concerning the
ability to observe a particular theoretical entity, nor do we associate such expression
with discussions about technological experimental devices employed to measure physical
magnitudes. We simply mean that, taking into consideration the mathematical struc-
tures of a particular theory, it can be deduced from them that some theoretical entities
cannot be observed by construction.1 As we will see later on, analyzing these examples it
will be clear that in order to construct physical theories, Dirac employed methodological
strategies which have been often in conflict with the observability principle.
In the second place, we aim also to underline the several and important differences
between Dirac’s view concerning the role of the projection postulate in quantum mea-
surements, the correspondence principle and the inter-theoretic relation between classical
and quantum theory with respect to those of Bohr and Heisenberg2; consequently, we
will argue that it is not completely correct to consider Dirac a fervent supporter of the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. In sum, we claim that there are sound
arguments and solid examples taken from his published papers showing that, although
his rhetoric was often sympathetic with positivist ideas and/or the Copenhagen inter-
pretation, his work has been in practice much less influenced by these doctrines.
The structure of the paper is the following: in Section 2 we will introduce the observ-
ability principle in the context of quantum mechanics taking in particular into account
Heisenberg’s empiricist attitude at the basis of the matrix mechanics formulation of
quantum theory, in Section 3, we show two case studies in which Dirac explicitly vi-
olated the observability doctrine. As mentioned above, we will consider on the one
hand, Dirac’s interpretation of the sea of negative energy electrons, and on the other,
the re-introduction of a quantum mechanical ether in the context of electrodynamics.
Section 4 will be concerned with the relationship between Dirac and the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum theory. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Observability Principle
Between 1925 and 1927 Heisenberg published two fundamental papers that crucially
contributed to the technical development of quantum mechanics3; these essays, in addi-
tion, established also a conceptual and philosophical jump with respect to both classical
mechanics and the old quantum theory, since matrix mechanics has been formulated
taking exclusively observable quantities into account, eliminating concepts referring to
unobservable theoretical entities. To this regard, quoting Heisenberg himself, S. Seth
writes that
previous approaches to quantum theory could be ‘seriously criticized on the
grounds that they contain, as basic element, relationships between quantities
that are apparently unobservable in principle, e.g. position and period of
revolution of the electron.’ The alternative, he declared, was ‘to try to
1An alternative, better way to label this impossibility would be formal unobservability, which will
be used in the remainder of the essay.
2To this regard the reader may refer to Bokulich (2004).
3We are referring here to Heisenberg (1925, 1927).
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establish a theoretical quantum mechanics, analogous to classical mechanics,
but in which only relations between observable quantities occur’ (Seth 2013,
p. 840).
Interestingly, (Blum et al. 2017, p. 19) note that Heisenberg viewed his “new theory as
merely establishing relations between observable quantities”4, whereas Hilgevoord and
Uffink point clearly out that Heisenberg’s leading idea, in his founding papers on quan-
tum theory, was that only quantities in principle observable and/or measurable should
appear in the vocabulary of a physical theory, “and that all attempts to form a picture
of what goes on inside the atom should be avoided. In atomic physics the observational
data were obtained from spectroscopy and associated with atomic transitions. Thus,
Heisenberg was led to consider the “transition quantities” as the basic ingredients of the
theory” (Hilgevoord and Uffink 2016, Section 2.1).
In general terms, it is possible to claim that in those years Heisenberg found it
methodologically unsatisfactory to formulate a mechanical theory in order to explain
the new observed phenomena making use of notions as position and orbit of physical
objects – which were not observable –, given that theoretical frameworks based on such
concepts were shown to be empirically inadequate. Then, he provided a new theory
establishing rules for the observed transition amplitudes and frequencies, taking the lat-
ter as the fundamental objects of his theory, and consequently, every physical quantity
in that framework could have been associated to something observable. Successively,
Born and Jordan interpreted Heisenberg’s theory as a proper mechanical theory orig-
inating what has become known as matrix mechanics, the first proper formulation of
quantum mechanics (Blum et al. 2017, Section 7). In addition, in order to understand
Heisenberg’s empiricist views, it is worth taking into account the developments of the
conceptual shift contained in Heisenberg (1927), the essay in which the first formula-
tions of the uncertainty relations were given. In this paper, Heisenberg employed explicit
operational assumptions associating the meaning of concepts and notions of his theory
– for instance the position or the momentum of a quantum particle – to experimental
procedures capable of measuring them. Hence, he provided the uncertainty principle
with an ontological interpretation according to which quantum particles cannot have
simultaneously well-defined values for position and momentum.5
Let us call this positivistic attitude the ontological observability principle. From a
philosophical perspective, the positive content of this principle implies that a meaningful
physical theory should be exclusively and uniquely about what can be experimentally
observed and/or manipulated. Alternatively stated, the negative content of such prin-
ciple states that objects, quantities or processes which cannot be directly or indirectly
observed should not be part of the vocabulary of any theoretical building, therefore, they
should not be considered meaningful terms of scientific theories. Since the latter guide
our Weltanschauung, i.e. our interpretation of the physical reality, and from them we
should reconstruct our manifest image of the world, it follows that unobservable theoret-
ical entities should be excluded from any ontological commitment. Heisenberg, however,
was not the only supporter of the positivist doctrine, as clearly stated by (Kragh 1990,
p. 262)
in the context of quantum physics the observability doctrine is often referred
4This paper provides an articulated and precise account of Heisenberg’s Umdeutung, and the authors
reconstruct the long and complex process that led Heisenberg to interpret his own theory as a new
mechanics, giving the due credit also to the work of Born and Jordan.
5To this regard the reader may refer to a note added to Heisenberg (1927); Hilgevoord and Uffink
(2016) provide a precise reconstruction of Heisenberg’s interpretation of the uncertainty principle.
4
as to Heisenberg’s observability principle, although Heisenberg in fact used it
after Pauli, who stated it clearly in 1919: “However, one would like to insist
that only quantities which are in principle observable should be introduced
in physics”. [...] Quantities that were in principle unobservable would be
according to Pauli, “fictitious and without physical meaning”.
According to Pauli’s perspective, observability is tightly connected with measure-
ments6, in the sense that what cannot be measured (directly or indirectly) should not
enter into physical theories. This statement clearly entails the normative ontological
import of the observability principle mentioned above: if some object, process or prop-
erty cannot be in principle or in practice, directly or indirectly observed, manipulated or
measured, then it should be considered a fictitious entity, meaningless and consequently
not referring to anything.
A locus classicus widely cited to expose Pauli’s ideas concerning the observability
doctrine can be found in his critique of Weyl’s unified theory (appeared in Weyl (1920)).
Pauli was strongly opposed to the idea of an electric field which was inside or internal
to the electron. His argument goes as follows: the field strength can only be defined
as a force on a certain test-body. Given that the smallest test-body available is the
electron itself, it follows that one cannot introduce the field strength into a mathemat-
ical point, for it would be a quantity in principle non-measurable since every possible
measurement would be inappropriate lacking a test-body. Furthermore, as Johanna
Wolff recently pointed out, non-measurable quantities threaten the empirical testability
of physical theories: “If a theory stipulates that a certain relationship holds between
several quantities, or that changes in a particular quantity are responsible for certain
phenomena, then it is desirable to have some measurement procedure, direct or indirect,
of that quantity in order to be able to generate specific predictions and to test them.
If there are reasons to believe, not only that such measurements are unavailable, but
that they are impossible, then this counts against the theory in question” (Wolff (2014),
p. 21). Since the electric field inside an electron cannot be in principle measured, this
very notion has no physical meaning. Therefore, one should consider it as referring to
anything. Apart from Pauli and Heisenberg, such an observability doctrine was also
shared by the people in the Göttingen school, as declared by Heisenberg himself in the
fifth session of his interview with T. Kuhn7:
[w]hen one spoke about special relativity, people always said, “Well, there
was this very famous point of Einstein that one should only speak about
those things which one can observe, that actually the time entering in the
Lorentz transformation was the real time.” And in some way that was an
essential turn which Einstein had given to the Lorentz idea. Lorentz had the
right formulas, but he thought that was the apparent time. Einstein said,
however, “There is no apparent and no real time; there is just one real time,
and that is what you call the apparent time.” So this turning of the picture
by saying the real things are those which you observe and everything else is
nothing was in the minds of the Göttingen people.
Against this background, and alongside the ontological observability principle consid-
ered so far, it is worth mentioning what can be called the causal observability principle,
6To this regard, Wolff interestingly points out that the notion of observability is untenable if it is
associated with mere perceptibility, for a detailed argument the reader may refer to Wolff (2014).
7The reader may refer to “Interview of Werner Heisenberg by Thomas S. Kuhn and John Heilbron
on 1962 November 30, Niels Bohr Library & Archives, American Institute of Physics, College Park, MD
USA”.
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which is contained in Wolff (2014). According to Wolff, it is not correct to claim that the
notion of observability employed by Heisenberg (1925) is concerned with measurements,
but rather, it should be led back to the notion of causal inefficacy. More precisely, the
notions of electron’s orbit and electron’s position are not meaningless in virtue of the
absence of hypothetical or actual experimental procedures able to measure such quanti-
ties. Instead, the latter do not play any causal, mechanical role in the theory. Therefore,
employing a sort of Ockham razor’s, Heisenberg eliminated such concepts from his own
matrix mechanics. In this manner, Wolff promotes a view of the observability principle
in which ontological commitments are disentangled from measurability conditions.
In this essay our aim is not to take position for a particular interpretation of the
observability doctrine in the context of Heisenberg exegesis; it is however interesting to
take into account different versions of the observability principle, since we are going to
show that in his works Dirac introduced several theoretical entities which are not only
in principle unobservable, but also causally inefficient. Thus, Dirac’s theories violate the
observability doctrine in both these variants.
Interestingly, there are several sources in which Dirac explicitly indicated Heisen-
berg’s influence on his own work on relativistic quantum theory and the methodological
relevancy of the observability principle. In particular, Dirac thought that Heisenberg’s
departure from classical theory was the recognition of the non-commutative nature of
the algebra of quantum observables: “that one should confine one’s attention to observ-
able quantities, and set up an algebraic scheme in which only these observable quan-
tities appear” (Dirac 1932). Another source worth mentioning is the first session of
Dirac’s interview with Kuhn and Wigner8:
Heisenberg made his trip to Cambridge, in I think, June, or it might have
been July, of 1925. He gave a talk about a new theory to the Kapitza Club,
but I wasn’t a member of the club so I did not go to the talk. I did not know
about it at the time. The first I heard of it was in September when Fowler
sent to me a copy of the proofs of Heisenberg’s paper [Dirac is referring to
Heisenberg (1925)] and asked me what I thought about it. That was the
first that I heard about it. I think Fowler found it interesting. He was a
bit uncertain about it and wanted to know what my reaction to it would be.
When I first read it I did not appreciate it. I thought there wasn’t much
in it and I put it aside for a week or so. Then I went back to it later, and
suddenly it became clear to me that it was the real thing. And I worked on
it intensively starting from September 1925. I think it is just a matter of
weeks or so before I got this idea of the Poisson brackets.
Moreover, he added that in discovering a better quantum theory able to overcome the
Bohr-Sommerfeld quantization method “Heisenberg’s idea provided the key to the whole
mystery”, with the introduction of matrix mechanics.
In addition, there are many other examples showing the influence of the observability
doctrine on Dirac, since he considered neutrinos to be unobservable and therefore without
physical existence, similarly he excluded from the set of existent objects the interior of
black holes.9 As quoted by (Kragh 1990, p. 80), Dirac stated in 1927 that
8The reader may refer to “Interview of P. A. M. Dirac by Thomas S. Kuhn on 1963 May 7, Niels
Bohr Library & Archives, American Institute of Physics, College Park, MD USA”.
9Interestingly, in both cases Dirac made patently wrong statements about these unobservable entities,
since, on the one hand, neutrino have been experimentally observed in the mid-Fifties and classified
among the group of leptons of the standard model of particle physics, on the other, Hawking showed
that black holes can emit radiation, and thus, they are not in principle unobservable entities.
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The main feature of the new theory [i.e. quantum mechanics] is that it deals
essentially only with observable quantities, a very satisfactory feature. One
may introduce auxiliary quantities not directly observable for the purpose of
mathematical calculation; but variables not observable should not be intro-
duced merely because they are required for the description of the phenomena
according to ordinary classical notions [...] The theory enables one to cal-
culate only observable quantities [...] and any theories which try to give a
more detailed description of the phenomena are useless.
In sum, the influence of positivistic ideas and the observability doctrine endorsed by
Heisenberg and Pauli can be traced in many places in Dirac’s writings. Nonetheless, it
is legitimate to ask whether or not such influence really had a decisive impact on Dirac’s
methodology of physics. In what follows we will answer this question in the negative,
explaining that Dirac cannot be considered a physicist with a positivist attitude, nor
that the observability principle played a crucial role in his works on quantum mechanics.
3 Unobservable Theoretical Entities in Dirac’s Work
In this section we aim to argue that Dirac should be neither considered a supporter
of a positivist philosophy, nor a physicist methodologically guided by the observability
doctrine. In order to support our thesis, in fact, we are going to consider two case
studies taken from his work in which he explicitly postulated theoretical entities which
are formally not observable in the sense defined in the first section. In our view these
examples show that, although Dirac rhetorically embraced the observability principle in
many places, in practice it played a considerably little role in his methodology.
In what follows, we consider in the first place how Dirac arrived to interpret the
negative energy solutions of his relativistic equation for the electron as positrons, whereas
in the second subsection, we discuss the re-introduction of the ether notion in the context
of quantum electrodynamics.10
3.1 Case study I: The Dirac Equation
Let us then consider our first case study, the Dirac relativistic quantum mechanical
equation for the electron, written for the first time by Dirac in his well-known 1928
paper “The quantum theory of the electron” (Dirac 1928). This equation is a milestone
in the physical literature, being the first result able to combine and satisfy the axioms of
both quantum mechanics and special relativity theory. Furthermore, from this equation
it has been possible to predict the existence of anti-matter. Indeed, we will here cover
the main steps that led Dirac to the interpretation of the negative energy solutions of
his equation as positrons, the anti-particles of the electrons.
In order to provide an elementary introduction to this equation, we start from non-
relativistic quantum mechanics, where the total energy of physical systems is defined as
10Although Dirac was not constrained in formulating new theories or advancing new ideas by the
observability principle, he cannot be considered a scientific realist in the usual sense. To this regard, in
fact, many scholars argued that Dirac’s realism is tightly connected with – and guided by – aesthetic
considerations concerning mathematical beauty and elegance of a given physical theory. For lack of
space we cannot discuss this issue in what follows. For details the reader may refer to Bueno (2005),
Kragh (1990), Pashby (2012), Wright (2016) among others.
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the sum of kinetic and potential energy:
E = T + V =
p2
2m
+ V (1)
then, taking into account usual quantization procedures, one defines energy and momen-
tum operators:
p −→ −i~∇,
E −→ i~
∂
∂t
.
From the definitions of the energy on the one hand, and the energy and momentum
operators on the other, it is straightforward to write a single-particle Schrödinger Equa-
tion (SE), which is the fundamental dynamical law of quantum theory.11 To obtain such
result, it is sufficient to multiply each side of (1) with the wave function of a particle
ψ(x, t):
Eψ(x, t) = (T + V )ψ(x, t)
With obvious substitutions, we arrive at the usual form:
i~
∂
∂t
ψ(x, t) = −
~
2
2m
∆ψ(x, t) + V ψ(x, t) = Hˆψ(x, t) (2)
where ~ is the Planck constant and Hˆ is the usual Schrödinger Hamiltonian, i.e. the
sum of kinetic and potential energy of the system at hand.
However, SE is not a reliable description of particles’ dynamics if one takes into
consideration relativistic quantum mechanics, since space and time derivatives are not
of the same order, i.e. are not treated symmetrically as required by relativity.12 In
order to make the Schrödinger equation relativistic, one may start from the relativistic
energy-momentum relation:
E2 = p2c2 +m2c4.
Following the straightforward procedure used to obtain (2) a few lines above, but making
now use of the relativistic energy-momentum relation, one obtains the well-known Klein-
Gordon equation (KGE) via simple substitutions:
−~2
∂2
∂t2
ψ(x, t) = −~2c2∇2ψ(x, t) +m2c4ψ(x, t). (3)
Contrary to the case of the SE, the KGE is a second order equation in both spatial and
temporal coordinates. Being Lorentz covariant, KGE satisfies the symmetry between
space and time coordinates imposed by relativity. This equation has plane waves solu-
tions of the form ψ = Ne±i(p·r−Et), hence, it yields also negative energies solutions as
consequence of the relativistic energy-momentum relation13:
E =
√
p2c2 +m2c4 and E = −
√
p2c2 +m2c4.
11We recall that the Schrödinger equation is not strictly derivable in quantum mechanics; thus, the
reader must consider what we have written as a simple and heuristic view to easily introduce such law
starting from the definition of the energy, since it will be crucial for the introduction of negative energy
solutions in the context of the Dirac equation.
12In the Schrödinger equation the derivative of the time coordinate is first order, whereas the derivative
of spatial coordinates is second order.
13More specifically, for such solutions the KGE gives −E2ψ = −|p|2ψ − m2ψ which entails E =
±
√
|p|2 +m2, so that one obtains straightforwardly also negative solutions.
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When this equation appeared in 1926, it was unclear how to physically interpret the
meaning of the negative energy solutions, as well as the negative probability densities
associated with them, since the wave function would not anymore be interpretable as
a probability amplitude in the context of the KGE. In the second place, this equation
did (and does) not allow for a treatment of particles with spin. Thus, due to these
difficulties, the KGE could not been considered a successful generalization of (2).14
These were the principal motivations which led Dirac to propose a new, different
equation of motion for the relativistic electron which could properly be considered an
extension of the Schrödinger equation, the well-known Dirac Equation (DE)15:
i~
∂
∂t
ψ(x, t) =
(
βmc2 + c
( 3∑
n=1
αnpn
))
ψ(x, t) ≡ HˆDiracψ(x, t), (4)
which is a first order equation in both the spatial and the temporal coordinates in order
to preserve Lorentz invariance. Here the wave function represents an electron of mass m
and spacetime coordinates (x, t), c is the speed of light, and the l.h.s. of this equation
represents the Dirac Hamiltonian. The latter contains the terms α, β which are 4 × 4
matrices, where β2 = α2x = α
2
y = α
2
z = I4, βαj + αjβ = αjαk + αkαj = 0, for every
j 6= k; therefore, α, β are Hermitian, their square is equal to the identity matrix, and
finally, they anti-commute. The usual representations of these matrices are:
αn =
(
0 σi
σi 0
)
and
β =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
where the σi are the usual Pauli’s matrices.16
Since the αi, β terms appearing within the Dirac Hamiltonian are 4 × 4-matrices
as stated above, the wave function which is a solution of this equation must be a
4−component object which in the physical literature is called Dirac spinor :
ψ =


ψ1
ψ2
ψ3
ψ4

 .
14Equation (3) is usually presented in this form:
1
c2
∂2
∂t2
ψ −∇2ψ +
m2c2
~2
ψ = 0,
which is equivalent to the formulation written above. This equation was first discovered by Schrödinger
who, however, discarded it for the already mentioned difficulties. The KGE is now a well-established
result in quantum field theory, since it describes spin-0 particle fields, among which we find the Higgs
boson.
15To maintain a coherent notation in the essay, we will avoid to make use of the covariant version of
DE.
16In brief, the Pauli matrices are three 2× 2 complex, Hermitian and unitary matrices of the form:
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σy =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
These objects have been introduced by Pauli as the observables corresponding to the particles’ spin
along the axis of the three-dimensional Euclidean space. For a detailed analysis of the Dirac equation
the reader may refer to Thaller (1992), Chapter 1.
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These solutions of the Dirac equation, these four component spinors, naturally include
the treatment of the particles spin, which was not treated by the Klein-Gordon equation,
in virtue of the presence of the Pauli matrices. Moreover, contrary to the case of (3),
the question of the probability density is solved in the case of the DE, since it is always
positively definite (cfr. Thaller (1992), Chapter 1).
Nevertheless, the crucial problem concerning a consistent physical interpretation of
the negative energies remained. In order to analyze this issue, it may be useful to
introduce the solutions of the Dirac equation for a free particle at rest (p = 0)17:
ψ = u(E, 0)e−iEt
where u(E, 0) is a constant four component spinor which satisfies the DE. The Dirac
equation has four mutually orthogonal solutions of the form18:
u1(m, 0) = ψ1 =


1
0
0
0

 ; u2(m, 0) = ψ2 =


0
1
0
0

 ;
u3(m, 0) = ψ3 =


0
0
1
0

 ; u4(m, 0) = ψ4 =


0
0
0
1

 .
Looking at these solutions, it is straightforward to note that there are two spin states
with positive energy (E > 0), ψ1 and ψ2, and two spin states with negative energies
(E < 0), ψ3 and ψ4. It must be said, furthermore, that the latter two components
cannot be simply discarded and considered surplus mathematical structure without any
physical meaning, since in quantum mechanics one needs a complete set of states for the
energy, i.e. all the four solutions in this case. Another problem related to such negative
energy solutions concerned the physical explanation of the stability of positively charged
electrons; a crucial question to answer was, in fact, why they do not fall into lower and
lower energy states. To solve these issues Dirac provided several possible interpretations
for these negative energy solutions, arriving at the beginning of the thirties – precisely
in 1931 – at the well-known Dirac sea, or hole theory, which led to the discovery of the
first anti-particle, the positron.
Through a brief analysis of the main steps followed by Dirac to arrive at this theory,
we will see that he employed methodological criteria in contradiction with the observ-
ability principle in order to provide the DE with a consistent solution to the ±e difficulty,
as physicists used to call it.
In the first place, let us point out that the problem of negative energy solutions of
the DE was strictly related to both philosophical and physical issues: at the end of the
twenties atomic physics included only two kinds of particles in its ontology, the positive
energy electron and the proton; moreover, since negative energy solutions were generally
considered unphysical, such negative energy electrons were considered at those times non-
existent entities. Nonetheless, as stated above, in the case of the DE it was not possible
to simply discard them, consequently, physicists had to find a sound interpretation for
17In general, wave functions of the form ψ = u(E,p)ei(p·r−Et) are solutions of the DE, where u(E,p)
is a constant four-vector component spinor.
18Here we are including the time dependence from ψ = u(E, 0)e−iEt.
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such states. This question was particularly urgent for Dirac, since he was well aware
that perturbations could cause transitions from states with positive energy to states of
negative energy: “[s]uch a transition – claimed Dirac – would appear experimentally as
the electron suddenly changing its charge from −e to e, a phenomenon which has not
yet been observed” (Dirac 1928, p. 612). Other physicists like Jordan, Klein, Pauli and
Heisenberg found the ± difficulty a serious trouble for Dirac’s relativistic theory of the
electron; in particular Klein showed that the motion of a simple electron moving against a
barrier is not correctly described by the DE, since it provides results completely different
from those of the Schrödinger equation. Similarly, another negative consequence entailed
by the expression E = −
√
p2c2 +m2c4 was that the energy of the electrons decreased
the faster they moved.
To overcome these puzzling issues, in between 1928 and 192919 Dirac proposed a
solution of the ±e difficulty interpreting the vacuum as filled with an infinite density of
negative energy electrons, regarding the vacancies or “holes” in such sea as protons.20
A similar idea was advanced by Weyl in the spring of 1929, however, he identified the
negative electrons with protons. Dirac knew Weyl’s proposal but was not convinced by
the interpretation of the sea of negative protons for three main reasons (Dirac 1930a, p.
362):
1. It would entail a violation of the law of electric charge conservation: if there would
be a transition of an electron from a positive to a negative state, we would assist
to a transition from an electron to a proton with the consequent charge difference.
2. A negative energy electron would have less energy the faster it moves, so that it
must absorb energy in order to be at rest, but Dirac stated that “[n]o particle of
this nature have ever been observed”.
3. If a negative energy electron would be a proton, it would simultaneously repelled
and attracted by positive energy electrons.
Against this background, Dirac’s own view has been expressed very clearly in a letter
sent to Bohr on 29th November 1929:
There is a simple way of avoiding the difficulty of electrons having negative
kinetic energy. Let us suppose the wave equation[
W
c
+
e
c
A0 + ρ1(~σ · ~γ +
e
c
A) + ρ0mc
]
ψ = 0
does accurately describe the motion of a single electron. Let us now suppose
there are so many electrons in the world that all these most stable states are
occupied. The Pauli principle will then compel some electrons to remain in
less stable states. For example if all the states of −ve energy are occupied
and also few of +ve energy, those electrons with +ve energy will be unable
to make transitions to states of −ve energy and will therefore have to be-
have quite properly. The distribution of −ve electrons will, of course, be of
infinite density, but it will be quite uniform so that it will not produce any
19It is important to recall that the Dirac sea hypothesis did not appear in Dirac (1928), on the
contrary, in that essay he wrote that negative solution could have been simply discarded (cf. Dirac
(1928), p. 618).
20For a detailed historical reconstruction of the proton interpretation of holes, the reader may refer
to Kragh (1990), Chapter 5.
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electromagnetic field and one would not expect to be able to observe it. It
seems reasonable to assume that not all the states of negative energy are
occupied, but that there are a few vacancies or “holes”. Such a hole which
can be described by a wave function like an X-ray orbit would appear exper-
imentally as a thing with +ve energy, since to make the hole disappear (i.e.
to fill it up,) one would have to put −ve energy into it. Further, one can
easily see that such a hole would move- in an electromagnetic field as though
it had a +ve charge. These holes I believe to be the protons. When an elec-
tron of +ve energy drops into a hole and fills it up, we have an electron and
proton disappearing simultaneously and emitting their energy in the form of
radiation. (Quoted in Wright (2016), pp. 232-233).
Successively, in the essay A Theory of Electrons and Protons published in 1930,
Dirac describes in detail this idea. Following the argumentative lines of the letter quoted
above, he started from the consideration that the most stable states for the electrons
– the states with lowest energy – were those with negative energy and high velocity,
then, he continued, all the electrons will tend to fall into such states emitting radiation.
The Pauli exclusion principle, however, will prevent “more than one electron going into
any one state”. Therefore, Dirac proposed to consider the overwhelming majority of the
infinite density of negative energy stets as occupied. Interestingly, such infinity is actual
in Dirac’s theory, since he explicitly stated that “[w]e shall have an infinite number of
electrons in negative-energy states, and indeed an infinite number per unit volume all
over the world, but if their distribution is exactly uniform we should expect them to be
completely unobservable” (Dirac 1930a, p. 362). According to the principal idea of this
essay, the holes in this infinite sea of negative energy electrons are protons:
[w]e are therefore led to the assumption that the holes in the distribution
of negative- energy electrons are the protons. When an electron of positive
energy drops into a hole and fills it up, we have an electron and proton
disappearing together with emission of radiation (Dirac 1930a, p. 363).
Concerning this particular solution to the ±e difficulty, Kragh stressed that the
methodological principle guiding Dirac was a belief about the unity of nature, i.e, the
idea for which matter was composed by two essential ingredients, electrons and protons
– neutrino have been recently proposed at the time but physicists were skeptical about
their actual existence, and the neutron was then referred to the electron-proton pair,
and not regarded as a new kind of particle. Hence, following the available knowledge
in atomic physics and its practice, he preferred not to introduce new theoretical entities
– to this specific regard Kragh speaks also about sociological concerns given the very
conservative attitude toward the proliferation of new particles in the physicists commu-
nity. Be that as it may, Dirac had no problem in introducing a formally unobservable
sea of negative electrons in his theory in order to solve the ±e difficulty, a move that
would not be justified according to the observability doctrine. Another instantiation
of the unity of nature principle is traceable in those years, since Dirac conceived the
possibility to reduce the then known species of elementary particles just to the electron.
More precisely, he thought that electrons and protons were not independent objects but
different manifestations of the very same fundamental particle:
It has always been the dream of philosophers to have all matter built up from
one fundamental kind of particle, so that it is not altogether satisfactory to
have two in our theory, the electron and the proton. There are, however,
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reasons for believing that the electron and proton are really not independent,
but are just two manifestations of one elementary kind of particle (Dirac
1930b, p. 605).
Despite Dirac’s efforts in trying to provide a physically sound and metaphysically ele-
gant solution to the ±e difficulty, his interpretation of holes as protons did not convinced
many physicists. In particular, Heisenberg calculated the electron-proton interaction ac-
cording to Dirac’s theory arriving to the conclusion that these two particles would have
the very same mass, a result which is contradicted by already available evidence, protons
having a much heavier mass with respect to electrons.
Successively, confronted with Heisenberg’s objection, and with many other physical,
mathematical and philosophical critiques to the proton hypothesis21, Dirac abandoned
it, turning to the positive electron idea. He introduced for the first time in Dirac (1931)
a hypothetical particle with the same mass of the electron but with opposite charge22:
A hole, if there were one, would be a new kind of particle, unknown to exper-
imental physics, having the same mass and opposite charge to an electron.
We may call such a particle an anti-electron (Dirac 1931, p. 61).
In his 1931 paper, Dirac proposed the well-known revolutionary hypothesis about the
nature of the vacuum, suggesting to consider it as composed by an infinity of negative
energy electron eigenstates, specifying this time that all – “and not nearly all” (Dirac
1931, p. 61) – such states are occupied. The holes, then, were interpreted as positrons,
and this idea became the standard interpretation of such negative energy solutions of
the DE. To this regard, Bohm and Hiley23 summed up the hole theory in a concise and
precise manner, characterizing it as follows:
What he [Dirac] proposed was that in the vacuum, all the negative energy
states were filled. Because the particles satisfy the exclusion principle, the
transition of particles to the negative energy states could therefore never
occur. However, when a particle went to a positive state, it would leave a
hole that acted like an antiparticle. So in effect a positive and a negative
pair would be created in such process (Bohm and Hiley 1993, p. 276).
Having roughly presented the crucial steps that led Dirac to postulate the positron
hypothesis, let us now consider some philosophical and methodological aspects of the
above discussion. In the first place, it is straightforward to understand that Dirac
21Dirac himself was aware of the inherent difficulties of this proposal, but the force of the unitary
idea of matter was superior, as noted in (Kragh 1990, pp. 96-99). Interestingly, Dirac was not much
impressed by empirical arguments (for instance those provided by Oppenheimer among others) showing
contradictions with the available evidence, but he readily detached himself from this hypothesis once
formal and rigorous proofs from Pauli, Heisenberg and Weyl were advanced. Here we can easily see
how the force of mathematical reasoning had a greater impact on Dirac in comparison to the empirical
evidence and knowledge.
22Ironically, Dirac thought that also the proton could have its unfilled hole so that “[i]n a few lines he
doubled the number of elementary particles” (Kragh 1990, p. 104).
23It is interesting to underline that the Dirac sea has been reformulated in the context of Bohmian
mechanics. On the one hand, Bohm himself in Bohm (1953) and Bohm and Hiley (1993) Chapter
12 discussed in depth this hypothesis in order to extend the pilot-wave approach to the treatment
of the fermionic field. On the other hand, contemporary mathematical physicists are working on the
developments of the Dirac sea approach, the reader interests in this approach may concentrate especially
on Colin (2003a), Colin (2003b) and Colin and Struyve (2007). For a more formal treatment the reader
should refer to Deckert (2010), Deckert and Merkl (2015) and Deckert et al. (2010). A philosophical
discussion of the Dirac sea in Bohmian mechanics is contained in Deckert et al. (2019).
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violated the observability principle in two different ways with the hole theory: on the one
hand, positrons were not yet observed quantities – they would have been discovered by
Carl Anderson at Caltech only in 1932 –, contrary to the case, for instance, of transition
amplitude in Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics, on the other hand and more importantly,
the sea of negative energy electrons is formally unobservable. According to the Dirac
sea picture, as already pointed out, the holes are the only observable entities, whereas
the sea must be unobservable since all the negative energy states are occupied in virtue
of the Pauli exclusion principle; therefore, it follows that being electrons in negative
states in a perfect homogeneous distribution, it is impossible to interact or observe such
sea. Moreover, we do not have empirical evidence for such infinite density of negative
energy electrons in the actual world, so that the sea is also causally inert.24 Hence,
in order to provide the ±e difficulty a sound physical solution, Dirac did not hesitate
to make abstract and audacious speculations involving unobservable entities, showing
in practice how the observability doctrine has not been an interesting methodological
option in formulating the hole theory.25
Secondly, we have seen that Dirac employed methodological principles which can
potentially contradict the observability doctrine. Discussing the proton interpretation
of the holes, in fact, we underlined that he was led by an ontological belief concerning
the unity of nature, Dirac being not only reticent to introduce additional particles to
those already known, but also determined to show the metaphysical inter-dependence of
electrons and protons. This principle can be understood as a sort of reductionist claim
according to which nature is composed by very few essential elements. Interestingly, as
we already noted, Dirac was not interested by the objections pointing out the empirical
inadequacy of the “hole=protons” hypothesis, and this attitude is certainly in conflict
with a positivistic methodology. Indeed, Dirac suddenly abandoned the unitary view
when rigorous mathematical arguments showed that his theory entailed wrong conse-
quences concerning the mass ratio between the electron and the proton. As said above,
critiques pointing out empirical difficulties of the hole theory were of secondary impor-
tance for Dirac, and, again, this would be not acceptable by a physicist guided by the
observability doctrine.
In the third place, another methodological principle adopted by Dirac is the principle
24This feature is also a logical consequence of the Pauli exclusion principle, since negative energy
electrons are homogeneously distributed and do not take part in interactions.
25It must be noted that many physicists raised strong objections also to Dirac’s theory as proposed
in 1931: some viewed the infinite sea of positrons as an entity close to the classic ether, regarding it
as a purely metaphysical notion, as communicated to Dirac by Igor Tamm in a letter dated 5th June
1933. As reported also by Kragh, notable figures like Landau and Peierls evaluated negatively Dirac’s
theory affirming that it was “senseless” in virtue of the presence of this unobservable sea. Similarly,
Bohr was unhappy with the hole theory and he expressed all his perplexities in many letters to Dirac,
most of them related with the infinite negative – but not observable – electric charged introduced with
the positron sea. Strong opposition came also from Pauli who refused to associate the new particle
experimentally discovered by Anderson with Dirac’s hole particle (cfr. (Kragh 1990, pp. 111-112) and
footnotes 104-105). In addition, Vladimir Fock posed serious challenges to Dirac’s theory in a letter
dated 12th February 1930: “Firstly: Can the Pauli exclusion principle be applied to a continuous set of
states (with continuous eigenvalues)? I always thought that it can only be applied to an innumerable
set of states (discrete eigen-values), for in the formulation of this principle it seems to be necessary
to numerate the states. For if the states may differ from one another by an infinitely small amount
one can never say that all the states in a region of eigenvalues, however small, are filled up. In your
theory, however, you apply the exclusion principle to all states, continuous as well as discontinuous”
quoted in (Wright 2016, p. 236). To counter this objection, Dirac advanced the hypothesis to quantize
space in infinitesimally small and impenetrable boxes in order to have discrete states of negative energy
electrons, but then both this idea and Fock’s critique were not further considered (cfr. (Wright 2016,
p. 243)).
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of plenitude, as Kragh called it. According to its traditional formulation, everything that
can be conceived as a metaphysical possibility, can be also an actuality in our world. In
the context of theoretical physics – which is where Dirac was moving – such principle,
with the due modifications, is often employed “in the sense that entities are assumed to
exist in nature as far as they are subject of mathematically consistent description and are
not ruled out by the so-called principles of “impotence”, or general statements that assert
the impossibility of achieving something” (Kragh 1990, p. 271). Thus, according to this
principle, if an entity x is amenable of consistent mathematical treatment, its existence
in nature cannot be in principle ruled out. Furthermore, to this regard it is important
to stress that Dirac explicitly followed what (Eddington 1923, pp. 222, 223) called the
Principle of Identification ; having defined a pure geometrical system Eddington affirms
that it
is intended to be descriptive of the relation-structure of the world. The
relation-structure presents itself in our experience as a physical world consist-
ing of space, time and things. The transition from the geometrical description
to the physical description can only be made by identifying the tensors which
measure physical quantities wit tensors occurring in the pure geometry; and
we must proceed by inquiring first what experimental properties the physi-
cal tensor possesses, and then seeking a geometrical tensor which possesses
these properties by virtue of mathematical identities. If we can do this com-
pletely, we shall have constructed out of the primitive relation-structure a
world of entities which behave in the same way and obey the same laws as
the quantities recognised in physical experiments.
Dirac, in fact, when explaining the new directions and advancements of theoretical
physics claimed that:
[t]he most powerful method of advance that can be suggested at present
is to employ all the resources of pure mathematics in attempts to perfect
and generalise the mathematical formalism that forms the existing basis of
theoretical physics, and after each success in this direction, to try to interpret
the new mathematical features in terms of physical entities (by a process like
Eddington’s Principle of Identification) (Dirac 1931, p. 60).
Dirac made use of the plenitude principle advancing the anti-electron hypothesis: al-
though anti-electrons were not yet observed, they were nonetheless a consistent solution
of the DE, therefore, a realist interpretation of such particles was possible. Alterna-
tively stated, in virtue of the plenitude principle, since the anti-electron hypothesis is
mathematically consistent, such entities can represent physically real particles. Interest-
ingly, Dirac used several times the plenitude principle in his works, for instance Kragh
mentions Dirac’s hypothesis concerning the existence of monopoles, which are not for-
mally excluded by quantum theory. To this regard, Dirac clearly wrote that “one of
the elementary rules of nature is that, in the absence of law prohibiting an event or
phenomenon it is bound to occur with some degree or probability. To put it simply and
crudely: Anything that can happen does happen. Hence physicists must assume that
the magnetic monopole exists unless they can find a law barring its existence”, (quoted
in Kragh (1990), p. 272). We will see with the second case study, the plenitude principle
is again at work for Dirac tried to reintroduce a quantum mechanical ether.
To conclude this section, we point out that in order to understand Dirac’s methodol-
ogy, it is crucial to underline that the principle of plenitude reflects a general rule often
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followed by the British physicist, i.e to deduce physics from mathematical considerations
– as shown by the above quotations –, meaning that physical conclusions are draw start-
ing from the mathematical structure of a given theory. It is straightforward to note the
tension and the contradiction between such methodology and the observability doctrine.
Furthermore, given the prominent importance given by Dirac to mathematics, it is not
a surprise that the observability principle succumbed several times to other more im-
portant methodological lines. This fact is sufficient to show, in our opinion, that Dirac
cannot be considered in any meaningful way of the term an empiricist or a positivist,
despite his rhetorical defence of such philosophies.
3.2 Case study II: The Ether and Quantum Mechanics
The second case study concerns Dirac’s theory of electrodynamics; what is philosophi-
cally interesting for our discussion is that in this context Dirac explicitly reintroduced
a quantum mechanical ether, a notion which has been abandoned at the beginning of
the XX century following Einstein’s theory of special relativity. As we will see, Dirac’s
ether is a formally unobservable theoretical entity. Thus, it provides a further example
showing how Dirac’s methodology was not guided by the observability doctrine to which
he has often been associated.
The British physicist was not satisfied with the way in which quantum electrodynam-
ics developed during the thirties, since that theory had to face the well-known problems
entailed by divergences and infinities. Dirac, as usual, tried to solve them by taking
an unusual way; in order to tackle these issues, in fact, he thought it would have been
necessary to start from a well-defined classical theory of electrodynamics, i.e. a classical
theory in which the central problem of the self-interaction of electron disappears:
We are now faced with the difficulty that, if we accept Maxwell’s theory, the
field in the immediate neighbourhood of the electron has an infinite mass.
This difficulty has recently received much prominence in quantum mechanics
(which uses a point model of the electron), where it appears as a divergence in
the solution of the equations that describe the interaction of an electron with
an electromagnetic field and prevents one from applying quantum mechanics
to high-energy radiative processes. One may think that this difficulty will
be solved only by a better understanding of the structure of the electron
according to quantum laws. However, it seems more reasonable to suppose
that the electron is too simple a thing for the question of the laws governing
its structure to arise, and thus quantum mechanics should not be needed for
the solution of the difficulty. Some new physical idea is now required, an idea
which should be intelligible both in the classical theory and in the quantum
theory, and our easiest path of approach to it s to keep within the confines of
the classical theory (Dirac 1938, pp. 148-149, our italics).
Such a theory was initially formulated in Dirac (1938) and then he continued to develop
it in a number of publications appeared in the fifties.
Hence, the British physicist proposed to start from a new classical theory based
on more sound foundations in order to be able to improve the quantized version; this
example shows the interplay between classical and quantum theories typical of Dirac’s
methodology, an attitude that many scholars labeled the reverse correspondence princi-
ple; we will give more details about these issues in the next section.26
26This route was taken before Dirac also by Adriaan Fokker, a collaborator of Lorentz, who was
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According to the classical theory of the electron as developed by Lorentz, Poincaré,
and many other physicists, the electron was thought to be a spherical particle of finite
size, or more precisely, a spherical distribution of electricity. In this context, if an electron
is moving in an external magnetic field, it is subject to the Lorentz force. However, it
also is subject to a self-force created by the field produced by the electron itself. This
fact clearly was a source of problems, since physicists thought that the electron would be
unstable in virtue of this self-force. In more detail, Lorentz showed that the electron’s
self-force can be written as follows:
~Fself = −α
e2
ac2
~˙v +
2
3
e2
c3
~¨v − β
e2a
c4
...
~v + . . . (5)
where in this equation α, β are coefficients depending on the electron’s structure, and
the dots on ~v represent as usual the differentiation with respect to time. The self-force
problem can be stated taking into account a point electron, i.e. an electron in which
the electron’s radius is zero (a = 0). In this case the third and the higher terms vanish,
but the first becomes infinite, on the other hand “if 1/a is kept finite, the equation of
motion contains not only an acceleration term but also derivatives of the acceleration
to all higher orders” (Kragh 1990, p. 190). Against this background, Dirac’s aim was to
find the correct mathematical equations to model the electron’s behavior with respect
to the set of available evidence obtained from experiments.27
Dirac solved the self-interaction problem starting from the usual Maxwell’s equations,
defining then the field quantities in terms of potentials. What is interesting for us
is that he took into consideration not only retarded fields but also advanced fields,
which generally were considered unphysical solutions. Dirac’s idea was to propose a
symmetrical role between them, so that using both retarded and advanced field he was
able to avoid the divergent term v in his equations (cfr. for technical details Kragh
(1990), Chapter 9). Dirac, furthermore, developed Lorentz’s classical theory arriving
at an equation where neither infinity terms, nor structural dependencies were involved.
Such theory is today known as Lorentz-Dirac theory.
The difficult part of the work was, needless to say, its extension to quantum elec-
trodynamics. As already stressed, Dirac aimed to remove the infinities of quantum
electrodynamics starting from a classical theory in which such infinities do not occur.
However, although he actually arrived at a classical theory without infinities, he was not
able to extend this feature to the quantized theory; this fact is clearly expressed in a
letter to Bohr dated 5th December 1938:
I spent the whole term working on the quantization of my classical electron
theory. The first problem is to express the classical equations in Hamilto-
nian form. [...] With the classical theory in Hamiltonian form it is merely
a mechanical matter to go over to the quantum theory. I have not yet sat-
isfied myself, however, that the resulting quantum theory has no infinities.
From the closeness of the analogy between classical and quantum theory one
would expect that any classical theory from which the infinities have been
pushed by the pertinent problems of quantum electrodynamics to improve the classical theory. For
details see (Kragh 1990, p. 191).
27In a passage taken from (Dirac 1938, p. 149) he wrote that “[t]he scheme must be mathematically
well-defined and self-consistent, and in agreement with well-established principles, such as the principle
of relativity and the conservation of energy and momentum. Provided these conditions are satisfied,
it should not be considered an objection to the theory that it is not based on a model conforming to
current physical ideas”.
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eliminated would go over into a quantum theory without infinities (quoted
in Kragh (1990), pp. 195-196).
Unfortunately, Dirac did not succeed in obtaining a quantum electrodynamics free of
infinite terms. In the fifties, he continued with his work on classical electrodynamics still
motivated by the same belief according to which, since there is a structural similarity and
continuity between classical and quantum mechanics28, it would make sense to solve the
problems of quantum theory putting the classical theory on firm mathematical grounds.
In his work during the fifties, Dirac considered not individual electrons as the elementary
blocks of his theoretical building, but rather a continuous stream of electricity: electrons
as point particles would have then be considered effects of quantum electrodynamics.
It is in this context that Dirac re-introduced into physics the notion of an universal
ether, which, he thought, could have been made compatible with the special theory of
relativity.
In the first place, Dirac reconstructed the argument against the ether that led to the
elimination of this notion. Let us consider a perfect vacuum, i.e. a region of spacetime
where there is no matter and no fields; according to the principle of relativity, in this
region all the possible directions within the light-cone must be all equivalent. However,
if an ether would exist at each space-time point of the region under consideration, it
would have moved with a definite velocity (obviously less than c, otherwise it would
have violated another axiom of special relativity). The latter would have consequently
preferred one of the possible directions among those possible in the light-cone. Therefore,
one obtains a contradiction with the relativity principle, since the ether would break the
equivalence among the directions in the vacuum. In the second place, the ether’s velocity
could not be measured, so that, according to the positivistic attitude surrounding the
special theory of relativity, something that could not possibly be observed should not
be admitted as existing; thus, the notion of the ether was soon dismissed after the
appearance of special relativity.
In order to show how such arguments did not definitely rule out the notion of an
ether, Dirac suggested to take also the knowledge derived from quantum mechanics into
account, and apply it to the ether:
The velocity of the ether, like other physical variables, is subject to uncer-
tainty relations. For a particular physical state the velocity of the ether at
a certain point of space-time will not usually be a well-defined quantity, but
will be distributed over various possible values according to a probability
law obtained by taking the square of the modulus of a wave function. We
may set up a wave function which makes all values for the velocity of the
ether equally probable. Such a wave function may well represent the perfect
vacuum state in accordance with the principle of relativity. (Dirac 1951, p.
605).
Hence, if one characterizes the ether as a physical quantity with a state of motion,
there are arguments from QM that enable one to reintroduce it among the realm of the
acceptable theoretical entities. As noted by (Kragh 1990, pp. 201-202), if the ether is
subject to the laws of quantum theory, its “velocity would be distributed over various
possible values according to some probability law. The principle of relativity indeed
forbade that there be any preferred direction of spacetime, which is a perfect vacuum,
28The formal analogy between classical and quantum mechanics has been analyzed by Dirac in detail
in his Principle of Quantum Mechanics, and this issue was recurrent in Dirac’s career; to this regard
the reader may refer also to Dirac (1933) and Dirac (1945).
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but this requirement could be reconciled with the ether hypothesis if one assumed that
in a vacuum all velocities of the ether would be equally probable and distributed in a
Lorentz-invariant way”.
The ether, then, was identified with the velocity field of the streams of electricity,
giving it a realistic interpretation and a dignity as a proper physical entity. Such a
quantum mechanical ether, however, was a weird kind of field being substantially a
set of potentialities defined at certain space-time points; according to Dirac’s theory,
while the ontology of the theory was about the stream of electricity, the ether filled the
vacuum.
In a successive paper (Dirac 1954), Dirac restated his arguments characterizing the
ether as a “light and tenuous” form of matter. Since the quantum indeterminacy applies
to very small and light objects, Dirac argued, then it follows that the ether “must be
strongly affected by the principle of indeterminacy” (p. 145). Therefore, at each space-
time point the ether must have indeterminate values for its positions and momenta –
one among those permissible – in order to not generate contradictions with relativity.
It is clear from this brief presentation of Dirac’s ideas concerning quantum elec-
trodynamics that Eddington’s principle of identification was implemented also in this
case: this new “quantum” ether has been considered a serious physical possibility by
Dirac since he was able to provide an argument (i) against its elimination, and (ii) its
coherence with special relativity in the context of his new theory of electrodynamics.
As in the case of the Dirac sea, the ether has been introduced as a possible theoret-
ical entity referring to something physically existing. Furthermore, such a notion is
inherently characterized as formally non-observable, since it is subject to Heisenberg’s
position-momentum uncertainty relation, which is taken by Dirac to forbid the simulta-
neous measurement – and definition – of position and velocity of quantum objects, and
consequently of the quantum mechanical ether. Therefore, we can conclude that also in
this case the observability doctrine has not been taken into consideration by Dirac in
his reflections concerning the problems of infinities in quantum electrodynamics.
Let us conclude this section stressing that Dirac himself unambiguously stated that
unobservable theoretical entities cannot be dispensed with in the structure and vocabu-
lary of physical theories, contrary to the fundamental tenets of the observability doctrine:
there must be unobservable quantities coming into the theory and the hard
thing is to find what these unobservable quantities are (Dirac 1973, p. 759).
Finally, it is fair to claim that the observability principle – in both the characteriza-
tions we have given above, the ontological and the causal – “did not affect his scientific
work. In fact, he [Dirac] did not hesitate to propose quantities that seemed to have only
the slightest connection to observables” (Kragh 1990, p. 264).
4 Dirac and the Copenhagen Interpretations of Quantum
Theory
After having shown that the observability doctrine was endorsed rhetorically by Dirac
in several places, but poorly considered in his own work, in this section we argue that
he should be disentangled from the supporters of the Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum theory. More specifically, in what follows we will show that often Dirac’s views
on quantum theory diverged remarkably – and in an irreconcilable way – from those of
Bohr and Heisenberg.
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Let us underline in the first place that many scholars argued that it is disputable
whether such interpretation exists, given that Bohr and Heisenberg had different – of-
ten conflicting – views concerning the physical and philosophical content of quantum
theory.29 In particular, among other things, they disagreed about whether or not the
wave function collapses in measurement situations: according to Bohr there was no col-
lapse of the ψ function – being entanglement and complementarity the real novelties
brought about by quantum mechanics with respect to classical physics –, whereas for
Heisenberg, the observer induced quantum jumps are the primary innovation of quantum
theory. Notably, to this regard Howard (2004) claimed that the so-called “Copenhagen
interpretation” was Heisenberg’s postwar invention:
What was new in 1955 was Heisenberg’s dubbing his amalgam of ideas the
“Copenhagen interpretation”, but having so dubbed it, Heisenberg regularly
reinforced the invention of a unitary Copenhagen point of view and posed as
its chief spokesperson[...]. It helps to recall Heisenberg’s situation in 1955,
especially the fact that the person who was Bohr’s favorite in the 1920s had
become a moral exile from the Copenhagen inner circle in the postwar period,
mainly because of the bitter rupture in Heisenberg’s relationship with Bohr
during his ill-fated visit to Copenhagen in September 1941 after taking over
the leadership of the German atomic bomb project [...]. What better way
for a proud and once ambitious Heisenberg to reclaim membership in the
Copenhagen family than by making himself the voice of the Copenhagen
interpretation? (Howard 2004, p. 677).
Interestingly for our purposes, if one considers the Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum mechanics the expression of Bohr’s views, it is straightforward to notice that
under many respects Dirac’s formulation of QM diverges remarkably from it. In this
section, in fact, we will concentrate on the diverse conceptions (i) of quantum measure-
ments, and (ii) of the correspondence principle that Bohr and Dirac had. Similarly, if
one considers the Copenhagen interpretation as the expression of Heisenberg’s perspec-
tives on foundational issues about quantum theory, it is equally straightforward to show
the remarkable differences with respect to Dirac’s ideas. Not only the British physicist
did not embraced in practice the young Heisenberg’s observability doctrine as shown in
the previous section, but also Dirac never shared the subjectivist interpretation of the
quantum mechanical wave function endorsed by the later Heisenberg (cfr. Heisenberg
(1958), pp. 99-100). Furthermore, as we will see in the remainder of this section, they
held opposite views about the inter-theoretic relations between classical and quantum
mechanics (cfr. Bokulich (2004) on this point), a disagreement which is reflected in their
incompatible methodologies.
Thus, given the peculiarity and originality of Dirac’s ideas about the interpretation
of quantum theory, we shall conclude that it is not quite correct to include him among
the proponents of the Copenhagen view – in both formulations given above – despite
the influence that Bohr and Heisenberg had on his work on quantum theory.
29The reader may refer to Howard (2004) and Jaeger (2009), Chapter 3. Pauli is also often associated
with the Copenhagen interpretation, but even his views differed substantially from those of Bohr. To
support this claim it is sufficient to consider the positivistic attitude he had in the twenties, or the
subjective interpretation of the quantum mechanical wave function; these that were not shared by the
Danish physicist (cfr. the above mentioned references).
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4.1 Collapse or Not Collapse?
According to the usual presentations of quantum mechanics, when a wave function un-
dergoes a quantum measurement, it collapses into one of the admissible eigenstates
of the measured operator. It is exactly the interaction between observed system and
experimental device that causes the suppression of the Schrödinger equation and the
consequent projection of the ψ function. However, such treatment of quantum measure-
ments was not endorsed by one of the founding fathers of quantum theory. Niels Bohr,
in fact, never introduced explicitly the projection postulate in his works on quantum
mechanics, as (Howard 2004, p. 672) explicitly stated: “Bohr never endorsed a distur-
bance analysis of measurement [...]”, he “always criticized Heisenberg for promoting the
disturbance analysis, arguing that while indeterminacy implies limitations on measur-
ability, it is grounded in limitations on definability”. Contrary to Heisenberg’s ideas,
according to the Danish physicist, the novelties introduced by quantum measurements
– and more generally by quantum mechanics – are non-separability, entanglement and
complementarity, as stated a few lines above.30 To this specific regard, Bohr himself
wrote that
the quantum postulate implies that any observation of atomic phenomena
will involve an interaction with an agency of observation not to be neglected.
Accordingly, an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither
be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation. After all,
the concept of observation is in so far arbitrary as it depends on which objects
are included in the system to be observed (Bohr (1934), pp. 54-55).
In this passage it is notably claimed that in the context of quantum theory – contrary
to the classical case –, it is not possible to assign an independent reality to the observed
system and the measuring device, once they have interacted; using a technical jargon,
they form what is now called an entangled pair. Therefore, the states of the observed
system and that of the measuring device show a mutual dependence, and they cannot
be written as they were separable, i.e. independent states as they were before the
measurement.
To this specific regard, Bohr always emphasized that quantum phenomena – that
he generally defined as the observation of a certain quantity obtained under particular
circumstances, i.e. with specific experimental arrangements, which play a crucial role in
Bohr’s theory of measurements – involve a mutual interconnection between the system
that has been observed and the whole experimental situation used to measure it. Con-
sequently, properties of quantum objects strictly depend on the interactions with the
devices employed in measurement situations; thus, changing the experimental set-up
will necessarily affect the nature of quantum systems:
The unambiguous account of proper quantum phenomena must, in principle,
include a description of all relevant features of the experimental arrangement
[. . . ]. In the case of quantum phenomena, the unlimited divisibility of events
implied in such an account is, in principle, excluded by the requirement to
specify the experimental conditions. Indeed, the feature of wholeness typical
of proper quantum phenomena finds its logical expression in the circumstance
that any attempt at a well-defined subdivision would demand a change in the
experimental arrangement incompatible with the definition of the phenomena
under investigation. (Bohr (1963), p. 3)
30For details concerning Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics the reader may refer to Howard
(1994), Howard (2004) and Jaeger (2009), pp. 124 - 136.
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Another central tenet of Bohr that comes out in this citation is the complementarity
principle. Although in quantum mechanics knowledge of physical systems is obtain-
able uniquely through measurements, there are nonetheless pieces of information about
their properties that cannot be obtained simultaneously given the incompatibility of ex-
perimental protocols needed to observe them, so that they cannot be represented by
a unique quantum state of the examined system. For instance, according to quantum
mechanics, it is not possible to obtain well-defined values for the position and the mo-
mentum of quantum particles in a single observation – although one can easily measure
these observables individually –, given the incompatibility of experimental procedures
needed to observe them. Thus, the information obtainable by incompatible experiments
is complementary.31
To this regard, (Stapp (2009), p. 113) claims that “any preparation protocol that is
maximally complete, in the sense that all the procedures are mutually compatible and
are such that no further procedure can add any more information, can be represented by
a quantum state, and that state represents in a mathematical form all the conceivable
knowledge about the object that experiments can reveal to us”. Thus, since for Bohr
quantum states represent the complete description of physical systems (cfr. (Jaeger
2009, 125)), it is clear (i) that the nature of quantum objects essentially depends on
experimental protocols and measuring devices, and (ii) that observations do not reveal
any pre-existing values of properties attributed to quantum systems. Thus, in virtue
of the practical impossibility to experimentally show the complementary features of
quantum objects, and the definition that Bohr gave to quantum phenomena, it follows
that we cannot speak about the properties of quantum objects in isolation, so that one
concludes that they have indeterminate features in non-measurement situations.
Furthermore, Bohr thought that the quantum formalism cannot be applied to ex-
perimental devices, being strongly convinced that one should describe them classically.
More precisely, it is worth noting that Bohr strongly emphasized not only that the re-
sults of quantum measurements are necessarily expressed in terms of arrangements of
macroscopic objects – the only physical bodies that we can directly experience –, but
also that the experimental procedure must be controllable and communicable in order
to provide an objective description of quantum phenomena:
it is decisive to recognize that, however far the phenomena transcend the
scope of classical physical explanation, the account of all evidence must be
expressed in classical terms (Bohr 1958, p. 39).
Hence, making communicability a necessary requirement for objectivity, classical, every-
day concepts cannot be avoided in order to have some knowledge of quantum systems,
since we have to ascribe “definite properties to individual objects, a mode of descrip-
tion inherent in ordinary language and definitive of “classical” physics” (Howard 2004,
p. 674).
Taking into account, instead, Dirac’s formulation of quantum theory, it is straight-
forward to see that it provides a remarkably different account of experimental situations.
In the first place, the primary difference is that he gives a completely formal treatment of
measurements, contrary to the more qualitative descriptions of Bohr. It is well-known,
in fact, that Dirac defined a quantum system as described by a state vector |ψ〉, which
is an element of a complex vector space called Hilbert space H, providing a complete
31Other classical examples of complementary properties of quantum systems are the wave-particle
duality, or the spin of particles along different axis.
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specification of its properties which are represented by positive, linear Hermitian oper-
ators A, acting on H. According to Dirac’s formulation of quantum mechanics, given
a measurable quantity A, its possible values are the eigenvalues (real numbers) of the
associated operator A, whereas possible states in which a system may be found after a
measurement of A are represented by the eigenvectors of A. Implicitly this defines the
eigenvalue-eigenstate link, a core tenet of his approach to QM:
The expression that an observable ‘has a particular value’ for a particular
state is permissible in quantum mechanics in the special case when a mea-
surement of the observable is certain to lead to the particular value, so that
the state is in an eigenstate of the observable [. . . ]. In the general case we
cannot speak of an observable having a value for a particular state, but we
can speak of its having an average value for the state. We can go further and
speak of the probability of its having any specified value for the state, mean-
ing the probability of this specified value being obtained when one makes a
measurement of the observable. (Dirac (1947), p. 253)
In this quotation, the probabilistic and statistical character of quantum theory is clearly
evident. This probability, however, refers to an inherent feature of the world, since only
in measurement situations a specific value of the measured observable is obtained. Fur-
thermore, according to the British physicist, the interactions occurring in measurement
situations cause a stochastic “jump” of the wave function, a projection of |ψ〉 onto a
possible eigenstate of the observed operator. This is exactly what makes QM inherently
probabilistic for Dirac. He viewed these jumps as “unavoidable disturbance” of quantum
systems in measurement situations:
When we measure a real dynamical variable ξ, belonging to the eigenvalue
ξ′, the disturbance involved in the act of measurement causes a jump in the
state of the dynamical system. From physical continuity, if we make a second
measurement of the same dynamical variable immediately after the first, the
result of the second measurement must be the same as the first. Thus after
the first measurement has been made, there is no indeterminacy in the result
of the second. Hence after the first measurement is made, the system is in
an eigenstate of the dynamical variable ξ, [. . . ]. In this way, we see that
a measurement always causes the system to jump into an eigenstate of the
dynamical variable that is being measured, the eigenvalue this eigenstate
belongs to being equal to the result of the first measurement (Dirac 1947, p.
36).
Again, before the first measurement, the system’s state is generally inherently indeter-
minate, since its properties depend strictly upon the act of observation.
According to Dirac’s views the remarkable novelties introduced by quantum theory
are on the one hand, the non-commutative algebraic structure of its formalism, given
the notable consequences it implies, and on the other hand, the stochastic collapses of
the wave function, which in this approach to QM are actual physical processes occurring
in space – whereas for Bohr such random jumps did not play any substantial part in
measurement situations. Furthermore, in Dirac’s formulation of quantum theory one
does not find claims concerning the objectivity of quantum measurements in terms of
communicability of observational outcomes that are typical of Bohr’s perspective.
In the second place, it is crucial for our argument to emphasize that also Bohr’s prin-
ciple of complementarity does not figure in Dirac’s formulation of quantum mechanics.
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Rather than introducing a kinematical and dynamical complementarity in quantum the-
ory associated with experimental protocols, he provided rigorous algebraic explanations
why non-commuting observables, as for instance position and momentum, the particles’
spin along different axis, etc., cannot be simultaneously measured, i.e. these operators
do not share a common basis of eigenstates. Consequently, it follows that in Dirac’s the-
ory experimental protocols do not play any decisive role in determining the properties of
a quantum object. Hence, Bohr’s complementarity seems to play only a marginal role.
4.2 The Reciprocal Correspondence Principle
Another fundamental tenet associated with the Copenhagen interpretation is Bohr’s
correspondence principle. In a nutshell, it affirms that classical mechanics is obtained –
through limiting procedures – from quantum theory, furthermore as (Falkenburg 2009, p.
126) claims, “Bohr employed the principle in order to establish inter-theoretical relations
between the classical theory of radiation and the quantum theory of atomic spectra. Af-
ter the rise of quantum mechanics, he justified his complementarity view of quantum
mechanics in terms of the correspondence between mutually exclusive quantum phenom-
ena on the one hand and the classical concepts of wave or particle [...] on the other hand”.
Speaking about correspondence principle and inter-theoretic relations between classical
and quantum mechanics, it is worth mentioning also Heisenberg’s views. He thought
that physical theories as classical Newtonian mechanics, thermodynamics, Maxwell’s
electromagnetic theory, special relativity or quantum mechanics, having reached a non-
contradictory, definite system of axioms, definitions and laws, and being able to provide
explanations for a notable set of phenomena, were closed, in the sense that elements of
these theories “exhibit a tight interconnectedness prohibiting any further modifications
or improvements” (Bokulich 2004, p. 378). Interestingly, Heisenberg considered these
frameworks complete, accurate, and correct in their domain of applications for all times,
meaning that such theories will be not modified or “called into question by any future
developments of science”.32
Contrary to both these views, not only the principle of complementarity plays a
little role in Dirac’s formulation of quantum theory as we have seen above, but also
the correspondence principle has been reversed. Taking into account the case study
concerning the introduction of the quantum mechanical ether, in fact, we explained
that Dirac’s strategy to remove the infinities from quantum electrodynamics was to
reformulate the classical theory, where such infinite terms were already present. Thus,
he tried to solve puzzles of quantum theories by starting from an improvement of the
classical framework. This example is sufficient to show the tension between Dirac’s
methodology with respect to both Bohr’s correspondence principle and Heisenberg’s
view of closed theories. As correctly pointed out by (Bokulich 2004, p. 386), “[f]or
Dirac neither quantum mechanics nor classical mechanics has reached its final form”.
Moreover, he considered physical theories always as approximations, and therefore, in
continuous development and progress.33
Using Bokulich’s expression, Dirac viewed both classical and quantum mechanics as
open theories, since both these frameworks are subject to modifications and interplay:
32Further details on Heisenberg’s conception of physical theories and inter-theoretic relations are given
in Bokulich (2006).
33To this regard in the second session of his interview with Kuhn and Wigner mentioned in Section 2,
Dirac stated: “I think it’s very likely that all our equations are only approximate. Our present quantum
theory is probably only an approximation to the improvement of the future. I feel that everything might
be an approximation and this comes very largely from the engineering training”.
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My own opinion is that we ought to search for a way of making fundamental
changes not only in our present Quantum Mechanics, but actually in Classical
Mechanics as well. Since Classical Mechanics and Quantum Mechanics are
closely connected, I believe we may still learn from a further study of Classical
Mechanics. In this point of view I differ from some theoretical physicists, in
particular Bohr and Pauli (Dirac quoted in Bokulich (2004), p. 389).
In the remainder of this section, we will consider another example showing the pecu-
liarity of Dirac’s positions with respect to those held by Bohr and Heisenberg concerning
inter-theoretic relations among classical and quantum theories.
Following his open view of theories, in the essay On the Analogy Between Classical
and Quantum Mechanics (Dirac 1945), Dirac aimed to recover and define the notion of
particle trajectory in the context of quantum mechanics, giving to the latter a more in-
tuitive, visualizable account for physical phenomena and extending the analogy between
these two theoretical frameworks.34 According to him, classical and quantum theories
were closely connected having a strong formal similarity; to this regard, in fact, Dirac
stated that
The value of classical analogy in the development of quantum mechanics
depends on the fact that classical mechanics provides a valid description of
dynamical systems under certain conditions, when the particles and bodies
composing the systems are sufficiently massive for the disturbance accompa-
nying an observation to be negligible. Classical mechanics must therefore be
a limiting case of quantum mechanics. We should thus expect to find that
important concepts in classical mechanics correspond to important concepts
in quantum mechanics, and, from an understanding of the general nature of
the analogy between classical and quantum mechanics, we may hope to get
laws and theorems in quantum mechanics appearing as simple generalizations
of well-known results in classical mechanics (Dirac 1947, p. 84).
Similarly, at the outset of (Dirac 1945, p. 195), he declared that
There are two forms in which quantum mechanics may be expressed, based
on Heisenberg’s matrices and Schrödinger’s wave functions respectively. The
second of these is not connected very directly with classical mechanics. The
first is in close analogy with classical mechanics, as it may be obtained from
classical mechanics simply by making the variables of classical mechanics
into non-commuting quantities satisfying the correct commutation relations.
[...] In the case when the non-commuting quantities are observables, one can
set up a theory of functions of them of almost the same degree of generality
as the usual functions of commuting variables and one can use this theory
to make closer the analogy between classical and quantum mechanics.
In this paper, Dirac developed a new theory of functions able to assign a probability
for non-commuting observables to have well-defined values. Let us consider two generic
non-commuting observables α, β, and let be f(a, b) a function of two real variables a, b
defined when a, b are eigenvalues of α, β respectively. Dirac showed how to assign a
34Since Dirac looked at the features and concepts of the classical theory to modify and improve the
quantum, Alisa Bokulich introduced the expression reciprocal correspondence principle (cfr. Bokulich
(2004), Section 6).
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meaning to the function f(α, β). In the first place, define f(α, b) a function of the
observable α, in which the variable b appears as parameter, via the following equation
f(α, b)|α′〉 = f(α′, b)|α′〉,
where |α′〉 represents an eigenstate of α with eigenvalue α′.35 Similarly one defines
f(α, β) via
f(α, β)|β′〉 = f(α′, β′)|β′〉,
where |β′〉 represents an eigenstate of β with eigenvalue β′. Such function determines
the linear operator f(α, β). Therefore, we have finally defined a general function of the
two non-commuting observables α and β. This definition can be extended to the general
case involving any number of non-commuting operators. It must be noted, however,
that such definition is associated to an order of these non-commuting observables: “[t]he
observables that one uses in practice in Heisenberg’s form of quantum mechanics are the
values of dynamical variables at particular times. They fall into a natural linear order,
namely the order of the times to which they refer. Our theory now enables us to set
up general functions of them, based on this order. The functions must not involve two
observables referring to exactly the same time, unless they commute. Apart from this
limitation, the power of forming functions that we now have is just as general as in the
classical theory” (Dirac 1945, p. 196). Dirac associated these new functions a complex
probability value, which should be interpreted as the meaning that for quantum observ-
ables α, β, γ, . . . are unlikely to have eigenvalues α′, β′, γ′, . . . . As a final step he used
these probabilities to introduce quantum trajectories. In more details, in this theory, a
quantum trajectory is constructed from a series of transition amplitudes between pairs
of adjacent points xi at different, successive times ti.36 Time can be so small allowing
to divide the trajectory into infinitesimal segments: 〈x′t|xt0〉 is then the probability am-
plitude of a quantum particle traveling in space from point x at time t0 to point x′ at
time t > t0. The particle may travel through intermediate points as well (if x, x′ are not
adjacent). In the general case (when a particle passes through intermediate points), one
may write:
〈x′t|xt0〉 =
∫
· · ·
∫
〈x′t|xn〉dxn〈xn|xn−1〉dxn−1 . . . dx1〈x1|xt0〉
where 〈xi+1|xi〉 is the propagator of the particle being at xi at time ti and arriving at
point xi+1 at time ti+1.
Since this probability is in general a complex number, as already pointed out, Dirac
claimed that this theory gets “a formal probability for the trajectory of the system
in quantum mechanics lying within certain limits. This enables us to speak of some
trajectories being improbable and others being likely” (Dirac 1945, p. 197), and therefore
it provides a more intuitive picture of the motion of quantum objects in space.37
In sum, having underlined the contrasting views Dirac held with respect to many
fundamental tenets of Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s perspectives on quantum mechanics, we
35This eqution is valid for every eigenvalue of α.
36For further details, the reader may refer to the original paper Dirac (1945); interesting discussions
about quantum trajectories in the context of Dirac’s work and its connections with David Bohm are
contained in Hiley and Dennis (2018); Hiley et al. (2019).
37This paper, although not very much discussed in the philosophical literature, has influenced Feyn-
man’s work on the path integral formulation of quantum mechanics. For details the reader may refer
to (Feynman 1948, p. 367) and Schweber (1994), Chapter 8.
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conclude that it would be erroneous to claim that Dirac was a fervent supporter of the
Copenhagen interpretation.
5 Conclusion
Although Dirac’s ideas on quantum theory have been heavily influenced by Bohr and
Heisenberg, physicists with whom he had intense and long correspondence and personal
relationships, in this essay we have argued on the one hand that Dirac should not be
considered a scientist methodologically guided by the observability doctrine, despite his
explicit defence of the latter in several places; on the other hand, we also claimed that his
views concerning quantum theory should be disentangled from those of the Copenhagen
interpretation.
More specifically, after having introduced the tenets of the observability principle,
we discussed two case studies showing how such principle played little role in Dirac’s
own works, since he postulated the existence of formally unobservable theoretical en-
tities – which are also causally inert – as the infinite sea of electron and the quantum
mechanical ether. Hence, we concluded that his support of the observability doctrine
was substantially more rhetorical than practical. Furthermore, not only we showed how
Dirac’s views about the quantum theory of measurement come into conflict with the
views of Bohr, but we also emphasized his different ideas towards the correspondence
principle and the inter-theoretic relations between classical and quantum mechanics,
claiming that his perspective on quantum theory – and on physics and mathematics in
general – should be kept sharply separated from those held by Bohr and Heisenberg.
In sum, reading Dirac’s works one cannot but note how complex a personality he was,
a scientist difficult to insert in predefined categories due to his creative and innovative
approach to physics and mathematics; in a century in which the new quantum paradigm
was developed and imposed itself, and classical ideas were seen as definitively surpassed,
he viewed physical theories as essentially mathematical structures which are always
subject to modifications, changes and improvements, without any pretension to achieve
an ultimate description of reality, and without any dogmatic attitude towards the future
progress of physics.
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